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DESIGN ARTEFACTS
Towards a design-oriented epistemology

Olav W. Bertelsen
Department of Computer Science, University of Aarhus, Denmark

Abstract
The production of design-oriented knowledge cannot be dealt with fruitfully based on traditional
epistemology. In this paper the concept of design artefacts is suggested as a possible backbone in
a future design-oriented pragmatic epistemology. It is claimed that a general understanding of how
design is mediated is a necessary first step in understanding the use and production of designoriented knowledge
Keywords:
Design artefacts, epistemology, design, activity theory.
INTRODUCTION
What is the nature of the knowledge needed in designing computer artefacts? How is it possible to
assess that knowledge? Most epistemologies, the philosophies of science, are treating science and
research as means for gathering true, universal knowledge. It has, however, been argued that the
universal criteria for valid scientific conduct have nothing to do with actual knowledge production.
For instance, Feyerabend argues that:
"There is no special method that guarantees success or makes it probable. Scientists do not solve problems
because they possess a magic wand -- methodology, or a theory of rationality -- but because they have studied a problem for a long time, because they know the situation fairly well, because they are not too dumb. "
(Feyerabend 1975, p. 302)

The idea of a universal methodology becomes particularly problematic in the relation to design
oriented disciplines. The epistemologies do not tell us how to deal with the production of design
oriented knowledge. Information systems development, human-computer interaction, computer
supported cooperative work and other fields related to the design and use of computer artefacts,
build on a broad range of disciplines from cultural analysis through programming and hardware
©Scandinavian Journal of Information Systems, 2000, 12: 15-27
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construction. Because computer artefacts eventually are to be used in the real world, research in
these fields tends to emphasise relevance over scientific rigour. Our field is a hodgepodge, where
it is hard to say that one result of research is better than another one; it easily becomes a matter
of taste.
"All methodologies have their limitations and the only `rule’ that survives is `anything goes’." (Feyerabend,
1975, p. 296)

The question is whether it is possible to formulate a design-oriented epistemology that acknowledges that “anything goes” in craving for good design and at the same time can be used as a
handle in knowledge appraisal. This paper introduces the concept of design artefacts as a generic
term for the outcomes of research in design and use of computer artefacts, e.g. theories, methods
compilers, editors, debuggers, and case tools. The concept of design artefacts entails concerns
for design and use, and the relation to research and method development. The purpose of the
concept is to strike a balance between including too much of the richness of reality, and reducing
too much, being too concept driven in research. It is argued that this concept contributes to the
foundation of the needed design oriented epistemology. It is the claim that an understanding of
how design is mediated by design artefacts in general, is the necessary first step in developing a
design-oriented epistemology.

DESIGN IS A MEDIATED ACTIVITY
In this paper, the design of information systems, and computer artefacts in general, is understood
as an activity oriented to changing another activity through the construction and introduction of
new (computer) artefacts. In the broadest sense, design is understood as the reformation of conditions for human (working) life. The basic assumption is that design is a heteropraxial activity, i.e.,
involving groups of people with different backgrounds and different motivation for participating
in the process. This general heteropraxiality of design can be explained by taking the cooperative prototyping session (Bødker & Grønbæk, 1996) as a miniature picture of design in general.
Cooperative prototyping sessions, like those reported by e.g. Bødker & Grønbæk (1996), can be
interpreted as an extract, exhibiting the basic features of design in general. In this picture, cooperative prototyping is a process where one or more designers work together with one or more
prospective users on developing new computer support for the users. Due to differences in professional background, training and interest, the two parties never achieve full explicit understanding of each other. Users do not gain a full technical understanding of the constructed artefact, and
the designers, no matter how participatory their approach is, never gain a full understanding of
how the artefact is going to be used. However, this is not a problem, because during design users
and designers, together, construct a reified, implicit, common understanding in shape of the final
prototype. Designers and users act together, but with incommensurable conception of the situation and its aim. In general, many system development projects result in unsatisfying solutions for
the users. The successful cases, however, can be attributed to successful acting together without
explicit shared understanding.
It is a tenet of activity theory that all human endeavour is mediated by socially constituted arte16
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facts (Vygotsky, 1978; Leontjev, 1978, 1981; Engeström 1987). Thus, also information systems design is mediated by artefacts. In this paper such artefacts are called design artefacts. In a standard
activity theory terminology design can be characterised as an activity where, a designing subject
shapes the design object by means of some design artefacts. The design object is the artefact
formed in design; the outcome that design activity is directed to. The designing subject is the
above-mentioned collection of professional designers and members of the practice the design
object is intended to mediate. Design activity is mediated by design artefacts. Examples of design
artefacts are programming languages, CASE-tools, specification standards, systems development
methods and theories of human motor performance. In cooperative prototyping the prototype
plays two roles, it is the continuously moving object of the design activity, but at the same time it
is a design artefact mediating the creation of insights and visions into the new information system.
As is argued below, this kind of doubleness is a basic feature of information systems design.
Representations play an important role in information systems and in information systems design. Most often information systems can be seen as representations of something, and in most
cases design artefacts are themselves representations or they rely on representations. In understanding representations, Wartofsky (1973) outlines a classification of artefacts and how their mediation of human activity is related to representation. In this classification, primary artefacts are
those used directly in the production of the means of existence and reproduction of the species.
Secondary artefacts are representations used to preserve and transmit productive practice, modes
of action, and skills.
"Secondary artifacts are therefore representations of such modes of action, and in this sense they are mimetic,
not simply of the objects of an environment which are of interest or use in this production, but of those objects as they are acted upon, or of the modes of operation or action involving such objects." (Wartofsky, 1973
p.202).

Tertiary artefacts are not related, in a direct sense, to productive practice; they reside in an “offline loop”, where they indirectly influence productive practice by mediating changes in modes of
perception and thereby the modes of action. Tertiary artefacts change the way we act by changing the way we perceive the world. Wartofsky (ibid.) understands perception as historically developed outward action; perception and action are two sides of the same coin. Based on Wartofsky’s
notion of primary, secondary, and tertiary artefacts, it is possible to define three dimensions of
design mediated by design artefacts; construction, cooperation, and conception.

Construction
Construction is the productive relation between the designing subject and the object of design.
System development is a process aiming at the construction of software and the environment for
its use. Seen as construction, design of computer artefacts is a process of programming – an engineering process. The artefacts mediating the relation between designers and the design object
seen as technical construction are programming environments, CASE tools etc. Deign artefacts
most often mediate all the three dimensions: construction, cooperation and conception. The use
of a CASE tool for construction makes the designers conceive the design object with the concepts
Olav W. Bertelsen
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supported by the tool, and will thus guide the process in certain directions. When looking at design as construction, the advantages of object-oriented programming languages are the possibilities of code reuse, the high degree of maintainability, and the stability of “code structure”, (these
advantages in a way also relate to cooperation and conception).

Cooperation
Cooperation is the representational relation between subjects involved in design. Design is a cooperative enterprise where different people with different professional backgrounds and different
motives are engaged in creating something new, the object of design. Design artefacts mediate
system development as cooperation, both as explicit means of cooperation (e.g. status reports
and specifications) and as means for the sharing of experiences, insights, and visions about the
design object.
A prototype mediates cooperation in a communicative fashion by letting users, through their
exploration of the prototype, impose knowledge about their context onto designers, and by letting
designers express their new insights by way of continuous change to the prototype.
Object-oriented design artefacts mediate cooperation in another way. The theories of concept
building referred to in some of the literature (e.g. Madsen, 1993 chapter 18, Coad & Yourdon, 1990)
imply an ontology stating that object-oriented modelling, aggregation, classification etc conform
to the basic constitution of the social and natural worlds and with human cognition in general.
Activity theory, including Wartofsky’s’ historical theory of perception, does not agree with this
implicit ontology. From this perspective, however, the virtue of object-oriented modelling can be
understood in terms of how it mediates the cooperative (and to some extend the conception)
dimension of design. It is not the “naturalness” of object-oriented models, but the primitiveness
of concept building that supports communication between users and designers around objectoriented models, and the simplicity of software structuring, through modularization etc., that enables users’ direct engagement in the constructive dimension through modifying the software.
In agreement with Wartofsky’s (op cit.) understanding of representation as outward action, participating in the process of modelling in design can be seen as tightly linked with, and depending
on, participation in construction and change. The cooperative dimension depends on representation; not in the naturalistic sense, being true and neutral, but representations supporting specific
acts towards the object of design. The secondary artefacts supporting the cooperative dimension,
mediate what Strauss et al. (1985) refer to as articulation work, “the specific details of putting
together tasks, task sequences, task clusters, and even the work done in aligning larger units such
as sub projects, in order to accomplish the work” (p. 175).

Conception
Conception is the dialectical relation between the designing subjects and the historically developing activity. Design is conception of the considered practice and of the new to come. Users and
designers achieve new understanding of the existing world and rooted in this they conceive a new
world that transcends the old. Design artefacts mediate learning and conception. A functional programming language for example facilitates the understanding of the design object as transformation of data streams. Conception is about changing the existing modus operandi, both by identify18
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ing more suitable ways of realising the established activity and by developing entirely new motives. Conception is both understanding (of the given) and imagination (of the better). A prototype
induces new visions and knowledge when it confronts the possible to the existing. Mogensen
(1994) has in detail explained how prototypes can be used as an analytical device. His idea is that
by introducing a new artefact into a given practice, constrains and potentials become explicit. In
the present terminology this means that a prototype mediates conception.
Any design artefact, no matter what its intended use is, to some extend mediates all the three dimensions of design. A debugger mediates construction by providing efficient feedback when the
programmer is coding; it mediates cooperation by representing programs and bugs in a standardised way, thus facilitating programmers joint work on the program; it mediates conception
by yielding alternative views on the actual program and serving as a way to learn about other
programmers’ code, e.g. in standard libraries. In the same way, a system description mediates
construction by being a high level programming tool; it mediates cooperation by fixing ideas to
be shared and by being a vehicle for the division of labour; it mediates conception by inducing
alternative, structured views into the problem in question.
The next four sections discuss how design artefacts mediate across heterogeneity; how design
artefacts have to mediate across the contradiction between construction and representation; how
design artefacts do not prescribe design; and how theories are design artefacts. In the final section, it is discussed how the concept of design artefacts can be the basis for a design-oriented
epistemology.

DESIGN ARTEFACTS MEDIATE ACROSS HETEROGENEITY
Design artefacts mediate across heterogeneity in that they tie involved activities together, and in
that they tie different rooms, phases or zones, of design and use together.
The heterogeneous activities contributing to design are tied together through their joint use of
artefacts and through their joint focus on the same object. Users and designers are driven by different motives and the object of design does not make sense in the same way for them. Design
artefacts tie different communities of practice together, maintaining meaning across groups but
making sense in different ways to the different groups. When designers and users work together
on a design specification, designers may perceive the specification as a model of the data flowing
in the prospective system, whereas users may understand the same specification in terms of a
working procedures in the organisation. Design artefacts do not only take different shapes and
serve different purposes to different groups, they also take different functions within one group
across time, during use and design, and in the different rooms (or phases) of a specific group’s
practice. In this way, system development method has one function in the project organisation’s
internal education prior to a project, and another function during the project. Working in accordance with the method means two different things in the two rooms, or phases, of a project.
Using Star’s (1989) terminology, design artefacts are boundary objects because they adapt to
different situations of application and at the same time maintain identity, thereby mediating divergent needs and viewpoints. As illustrated by using the cooperative prototyping session as a
general miniature picture of design, also the object of design is a boundary object. This boundOlav W. Bertelsen
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ary objectness reifies shared understanding in design. Hence explicitly formulated shared understanding may not be needed as long as design artefacts support the making of the design objects
that fit all the incommensurable communities of users, designers, etc.
Following the emphasis on heterogeneity, design can be described as a process of transform-

ing artefacts from the domain of use. In such a process, design artefacts mediate across use and
design; designers and users; and across construction and representation. Bærentsen (1989) has
explained that development of technology can be understood as crystallisation of activity with one
generation of an artefact into artefacts in the next generation. In the case of weapon technology,
Bærentsen’s example, the flint gun crystallises the manual act of lighting the gunpowder when
using earlier generations of handguns. Understanding design as transformation is to understand
it as a process of deliberate crystallisation. Hence, design is to take artefacts from the considered
practice into the room, or zone, of design. In this room the artefacts are changed and eventually
they are brought back into the practice of use. The success of the transformed artefacts depends
on their ability to mediate use when they have been brought back. This ability may be ensured by
continuously confronting the artefacts under transformation with (simulated) use.
An example of design understood in terms of transformation comes from a project with a large
music festival (Bertelsen 1996, 1998). To support their own work, one group of festival volunteers
developed a checklist, crystallising established routines. The checklist was later spread out to
larger parts of the organisation. Even later, the checklist entered a design project developing support for festival planning, it became a database sketch, an object oriented model and finally a
prototype of a planning tool. The final system was a computer-based version of the checklist, being able to print out “checklists” on papers. Bertelsen (1996) concludes that the lack of commitment in the festival organisation, to enable serious confrontation with simulated use during the
design process was the main reason for the failing success of the final system.
The transformation of artefacts through design is a representation process. The transformed artefacts both exist in their original form within the room — or domain — of use, and as representations in the room of design. Hence, artefacts being transformed are boundary objects (Star, 1989)
in the sense that they exist and mediate across different activity systems, across groups, across
phases of practice, and across the transition between use and design. Understanding design as
the transformation of artefacts emphasises concreteness of representations in design; thereby it
contradicts viewing representations in design as the abstract unfolding of general constitution of
the social and technical domain. Examples of practical techniques supporting the concreteness
of representations can be found in the participatory design literature, e.g. cooperative prototyping
(Bødker & Grønbæk, 1991), organisational games (Ehn & Sjögren, 1991), and mock-ups (Ehn &
Kyng 1991).
A design-oriented epistemology should address the important issue of mediation across heterogeneity. Firstly, by supporting that design artefacts, the outcomes of design-oriented research,
are suited for mediating the three dimensions of design, construction, cooperation and conception, and by ensuring that design artefacts make sense in different rooms of (design) practice.
Secondly, the need for mediation across fundamentally different rooms of use, design and research, implies an emphasis on modes of representation that take development and change as
basic features and that are supplying handles for the designer in handling such dynamics
20
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REPRESENTATION VERSUS CONSTRUCTION
Design artefacts must mediate a basic contradiction between representation and technical con-

struction. This double character of being split between representation and technical construction
is prominent in relation to many aspects of design. Technical construction of computer systems
is extremely formalised, whereas representations in design depend on a high degree of openness and interpretability. This double character is a problem because the plasticity of secondary
artefacts is obstructing or obstructed by the naturalism and formalisation of primary artefactness.
The example below illustrates this requirement for design artefacts.
A small in-house development department experimented with using the diagrams from a CASE
tool, based on structured design (Yourdon 1982), together with users. They found that, output
from the CASE-tool both facilitated and obstructed user-designer cooperation. In one particular
situation, a context diagram (poetically referred to as the “the sunflower”) was successfully applied as a common frame of reference shared by the whole project group during the project. In
another situation the designers had no luck trying to apply diagrams from the same CASE-tool
together with the users in the project group (Laursen et al. 1990).
From a technical perspective, structured design (Yourdon 1982) is a high-level program construction tool, but at the same time this design artefact mediates cooperation and conception.
In both the above situations, the CASE tool and its output had a double role, both mediating production of machine executable code and mediating cooperation and the conception of the new
system. In the first situation (the sunflower) the technical contents was simple enough to allow
for the project groups free attribution of meaning to the diagram, whereas in the other situation
the model was so complicated and incomprehensible for the users, that it was impossible to do
anything with it beyond trying to understand what it was about. The “sunflower” offered openings into a poetic world, whereas other diagrams only yielded frustration. The applicability of
structured design tools in cooperation and conception with users depends on the designers’ success in establishing common representations based on the tool.
A distinction between meaning and sense, similar to the distinctions in linguistics between what
a sign points to and what it does in use, can be applied in analysing design artefacts. Technical
instruments have both meaning and sense in the following way. The meaning of a hammer is the
assemblage of shaped iron and wood. The sense of the hammer is that it is used by carpenters for
driving nails. The sense of the hammer is “crystallised” in secondary artefacts, mediating hammering practice; e.g. anecdotes and sayings. The meaning of the “Sunflower” described above
was that it was a (formalised) SA/SD context diagram. The sense of the “Sunflower” in the cooperation between designers and users was the context of the prospective computer system, and
the way it would mediate parts of the relations between activities in the organisation. This has
some degree of tertiary artefactness to it, because the poetic connotations of summer and nature
may have mediated the emergence of entirely new ways of understanding the workplace.
Programming shares the same kind of doubleness, being both interpretable representation and
hardwire construction. Naur (1985) rejects the idea that programming can be seen as the mere
production of machine executable code — isolated construction without elements of conception
and cooperation. He explains that a theory about what the program does, and how it does it,
is built simultaneously with the construction of the executable code. Thus, in the terminology
Olav W. Bertelsen
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introduced above, programming work has the double character of being both construction and
conception. This theory cannot be written down or otherwise formalised, and is only accessible to
the programmers working on the particular project. In Wartofsky’s terminology Naur’s “program
theory” is a secondary artefact conserving the acquired knowledge and skills in working with the
program. However, Naur bases his analysis on the individualist philosophy of Ryle, thus neglecting the societal/cultural aspect of representation. The concept of secondary artefacts helps us
understand that the way humans understand their surroundings (including programs) is culturally mediated. Secondary artefacts not only conserve knowledge and skill among the individuals
whose experience they are based on, but secondary artefacts also transfer these across a given
culture, e.g. the programming profession.
A design-oriented epistemology should explicitly addressed the contradiction between representation and construction, thereby providing means for handling the transition from interpretation to running software. Furthermore, such an epistemology should support the production of
knowledge about the social nature of technical issues, e.g. about the cultural aspects of source
code indentation.

DESIGN ARTEFACTS DO NOT PRESCRIBE PRACTICE
Design artefacts do not prescribe design practice. In most cases a specific design artefact is intended to be used in a specific way, and just as often the actual way in which the design artefact
mediates design is very different from this intention. In most cases, the relation between the principles of intended use and the actual practice with the artefact is far from trivial. This discrepancy
is most obvious in the case of design methods, illustrated by the below excerpt (reconstructed
from interview notes) from dialog between an interviewer (I) and a designer (D) of embedded
software.
I: How do you do when you specify the software for the pumps?

D: Well, according to the SPU method … [lengthy summary of a method book].

I: OK. The pump we looked at in the front room, the one you designed the software for, how did you make the
specification for that?

D: With that particular pump the situation was a little unusual, so we did not go through the steps of the SPU
method.

[…]

I: Let’s talk about the project you are currently involved with. How is specification done there?

D: The current project is not a normal design project, because we are also developing a general framework.

22
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The embedded software department at the machine factory had used some effort in implementing the SPU method (Biering-Sørensen, et al., 1988), but the interviewed designer had never gone
through the steps, defined in the method book, in a project. This is in accordance with findings
of Button & Sharrock (1994), who studied the use of design methods in a development project
and found a tension between methodologists’ ambition (clarity, coherence and closure) and the
indeterminate character of actual design work. This mismatch between the prescriptions of the
method and the actual design work can be understood in terms of the doubleness of meaning and
sense of the method. The meaning of the method being the literal prescription of how to proceed
through specified steps, filling in certain forms etc.; the sense of the method being the actual use
of it, the sparse use of selected techniques combined with common sense, etc. However, when
the distance between this “meaning” and “sense” becomes too long, the meaning-sense relation
degenerates to a contradiction between principles and practice.
The general discrepancy in design artefacts between what they prescribe and the practice they
induce can in some situations be understood as a contradiction between the design artefact producing activity and design practice. In other situations, the discrepancy between principles and
practice can be understood as a result of the relation between meaning and sense in design artefacts. In the case of the designer of embedded software, the meaning of the SPU method was
the prescriptions for design printed in the method book, whereas the sense of the method was
the way it actually influenced work in concrete design projects. Methods, or method books, are
secondary artefacts in the sense that their prescriptions are rooted in practice. But, following
Wartofsky’s argument, secondary artefacts are not transferring and maintaining modes of action
because of their naturalism. Some method books are based on fiction, war stories from other
fields and the like, which in relation to the purpose of a method book has a character of tertiary
artefactness, reshaping the designers’ view on their own practice. We cannot expect methods to
prescribe practice in a direct manner. Instead, the prescriptions embedded or expressed in design
artefacts are resources; they do not determine process and product; they are seeds that can develop in concrete practice in varying ways depending on specific circumstances.
A design-oriented epistemology should reflect that knowledge, no matter whether it has the
form of theory, method or tool, is used in unforeseen ways. Because knowledge about context
and scope is often left out when the outcomes of research are applied (Meister & Farr, 1967),
this exact knowledge should be made an operational part of the design-oriented knowledge, the
design artefacts. However, since the outcomes of design-oriented research should not only be
considered as something conveying universal knowledge and universal prescriptions for design,
the outcomes of design-oriented research can never become completely self-contained and portable. The next section explores how theories can be understood as design artefacts.

THEORIES ARE DESIGN ARTEFACTS
Theories are design artefacts. The outcome of research is often formulated as theory; that is,
highly universal representations, pretending to be independent of concrete context, practice or
situation. From the point of view of design, theories are design artefacts, taking different roles in
design; from worldviews, guiding the designer and helping him assess the situations and keep
the goals in mind, to tools mediating the achievement of specific results. In this way, the direct
Olav W. Bertelsen
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outcomes of research mediate design.
The application of Fitts’ law in human-computer interaction illustrates how theories act as design artefacts. Fitts’ law (Fitts, 1954) describes the limitations of human motor performance, as
established and verified through laboratory experiments. The law is based on mathematical information theory (Shannon & Weawer, 1949), and states that there is a specific relation between
the length of a movement, the size of the target and the time it takes. Fitts’ law has been used extensively in human-computer interaction research, often in analysing novel input devices. Based
on the application of Fitts’ law in the human-computer interaction literature, Bertelsen (1994) describes three roles this specific theory takes as a design artefact: worldview, tool for calculation,
and metaphor. The calculation role has to do with the construction dimension of design, by supporting interface optimisation in well-defined ways. The metaphor role is related to cooperation
by supplying a vocabulary for communication about pointing and screen layout issues’ effect on
pointing time, and it is related to conception by setting a frame of thought in the conception of
new interface ideas. The worldview role is a matter of supporting conception. In this role, Fitts’
law expresses the basic view on human-computer interaction as being decomposable and possible to treat through laboratory experiments. Like any other design artefact, Fitts’ law most often
take more than one role at a time. By thinking about interface problems in Fitts’ law terms, the
metaphor role, other views are excluded. Fitts’ law then draws the main view on the design task
towards time performance, becoming a Trojan horse for a cognitivist worldview. The three roles
of Fitts’ law as a design artefact, described by Bertelsen (1994), cannot be generalised. However,
they span a spectrum of ways in which theories mediate design. Between being tool, which is goal
directed and “neutral”, and being worldview which is value based and motive oriented. Mediating
construction, cooperation and conception.
As another example, activity theory spans a similar range of roles as a design artefact. It takes
a tool-like role, when used as the basis for analysing empirical data of interaction with a specific
computer artefact in terms of focus shifts (Bødker 1991). It takes a worldview-like role when, designers adopt the activity theory framework as their way of understanding technology, i.e. as culturally constituted mediation of human activity etc. It takes a more metaphor-like role, as a vehicle
for communication, in shape of the well-known double triangle figure (Engeström 1987) or as activity analysis (Korpela et al., this issue). While, activity theory mediates cooperation and conception in quite clear ways, it is still an open question how it may mediate construction in a direct
sense.
Theories mediate construction, communication and conception by playing different roles in the
continuum from tool to worldview, being primary, secondary and tertiary artefacts. Theories explicate the doubleness of design artefacts of mediating construction and representation; as in the
case with Fitts’ law both mediating technical optimisation of user interface layout, and representing specific understandings of the interface design problem. Theories, like other design artefacts,
are boundary objects, most prominently by tying the production of “universal facts” in research
together with design. The notion of theories as design artefacts contributes to a pragmatic philosophy of design science by providing a criterion for the assessment of theory.
A design-oriented epistemology should acknowledge that theories are design artefacts mediating construction, cooperation and conception.
24
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TOWARDS A DESIGN-ORIENTED EPISTEMOLOGY
Above, the concept of design artefacts has been outlined. Through the explicit focus on heterogeneity and socially developed mediation, this concept turns out to be a fruitful vehicle in understanding knowledge production related to the design of information systems. The paper has
pointed to specific features of design artefacts and their implication for a design-oriented epistemology.
First of all, by understanding theories as being design artefacts, traditional concerns over method, rigor and so forth— concerns that are hard to deal with across the broad range of disciplines
involved in the design of information systems—become easier to handle, in that they are balanced
against the concern for practical relevance. The test bed for theories related to the development
of information technology is not the controlled scientific laboratory, but the utilisation in practical
design. This does not mean, however, that anything goes. It only points out the direction for a
new kind of rigor in information systems research, rejecting irrelevant results, and acknowledging
the particular and the situation specific.
Design artefacts simultaneous mediation of construction, cooperation and conception implies
that the production of design-oriented knowledge is subjected to a broad range of criteria for
validity. Knowledge valid for construction may be produced according to methods emphasising
predictability and generality. Knowledge valid for cooperation must include a far broader range of
criteria focusing on interpretation and collective action. Knowledge relevant for conception must
be produced according to criteria and methodologies that enables research to acknowledge transitions between the present the past and the future; methodologies that does not require detachment form context and isolation in time. In short, development and change must be acknowledged
as a basic feature of reality — conveniently, this acknowledgement is a basic tenet of activity
theory. More specifically, design as transformation or artefacts is an example of a basic concept
acknowledging change and development as a basic feature of the object of information systems
research
Design artefacts mediate across the heterogeneous rooms of use, design and research, and
across the multiple dimensions of design. The concept of design artefacts contributes to an understanding of the mechanisms underlying the intertwinement of different groups and professions in
the networks of use, design and research activities, by maintaining focus on material mediation.
The concept of boundary objects has been extended to denote mediation across situations, and
not only across heterogeneous groups. Crystallisation and design as transformation of artefacts
are mechanisms build on this extended meaning of boundary objectness across historical generations of the same practice. Understanding how design artefacts are extended boundary objects,
may be a resource in understanding how knowledge can be transferred, or transformed, from
research to practice and vice versa.
The doubleness in the contradiction between representation and construction in design is a
problem that a design-oriented epistemology should address explicitly. Design-oriented knowledge, taking the form of theories, tools, or methods (or something else) should include, or be accompanied by directions of how to deal with the transition from the multiple voices of interpretation to the hardwired meaning of running program code.
Finally, a design-oriented epistemology should acknowledge that design artefacts do not preOlav W. Bertelsen
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scribe actual design practice. This gives research and method development the freedom of not
needing to encompass the entire reality. The production of design-oriented knowledge can afford
a high degree of rigidity and narrow-mindedness, designers always adapt methods, tools and
theories to actual practice.
The concept of design artefacts offers a vehicle for general self-reflection in design-oriented research, and for understanding the role of theory in particular. In terms of an epistemology, the
concept of design artefacts implies that validity is a partial aspect of theory and research. An epistemology based on the design artefact concept enables and accepts an incoherent collection of
partial theories as a valid “science base” for design without turning into relativism. Hence, negating the tenet of logical positivism that theory should be universally applicable independently of
context and purpose; always being true and independent of motive and values. The concept of
design artefacts unifies concerns related to use, design and research in information systems in a
pragmatic, design oriented epistemology.
"At all times man approached his surroundings with wide open senses and fertile intelligence, at all times he
made incredible discoveries, at all times we can learn from his ideas." (Feyerabend 1975, p.307).
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